My dissertation uses new and substantially more reliable data to better answer some of the classic questions about the Lancashire cotton spinning industry in a comparative setting. In so doing it generates some surprising results about its New England rival. 
being spun into yam and woven into cloth. In addition, Cotton's unpublished thesis gives the location of individual spinning and weaving mills in Blackburn, a typical Lancashire cotton town, allowing us to assess exactly where cotton could be spun and woven in a representative district.
For New England, the new sources of data are more extensive, and much "newer." The 1905 Census of Manufactures gives capital to labor ratios, that is, the number of spindles per operative. These figures can be compared with new archival sources: for mule spinners, the figure is within 1% of the average given in 3 firm records; for ring spinners, the Census figure is 12% lower than the average derived from the records of 6 mills.2 Data on weekly wages are taken from a newly discovered survey carried out in 1904 by Pidgen, head of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics. His figure for mule wages is 8% higher than the average wage paid by the two firms whose records sunfire. For ring spinning his figure is identical to the average of seven observations that were taken from finn records.
Output per spindle comes from the production records of three key firms -the Amoskeag, Lyman, and Naumkeag mills. Each recorded the weight of yam produced by each spindle, at the various counts produced. For each method of spinning, the firm's data are merged and then estimated to give two continuous, count specific series for productivity. The procedure works well for both ring and mule spinning, with R 2 values of 0.941 and 0.994 respectively. As we would expect, the count of yarn spun is an excellent predictor of productivity, with t-statistics of 17.37 and 69.97 respectively.
Hypotheses 3
Ring spinning is a more modern technology, and allowed the mill owner to economize on labor costs by using unskilled female labor in place of more expensive skilled male labor. A number of hypotheses have been advanced to explain why Lancashire continued to install mules. The first hypothesis (uniformly rejected by modem authors) suggested that although mule spinning was more expensive, spinners were simply irrational in their attachment to a well-known technology. Conversely, it has been argued that spinners were rational in installing mules simply because mule spinning was a cheaper method of production in Britafin, where skilled labor was abundant, and so relatively cheap [Sandberg, 1969 [Sandberg, , 1974 . Two alternative hypotheses have been advanced [see Mass and Lazonick, 1990] . Both accept that mule spinning was associated with lower unit costs in Lancashire, but argue that ring unit costs would have been reduced if the industry structure had been different. In particular, had Lancashire ceased to consist of small, vertically specialised firms, almost all of which either spun yam or wove cloth (but not both), the benefits of ring spinning would have been better realised, for two reasons. First, there are well known technical (and so cost) complementadties between ting spindles and automatic looms, a new method of weaving invented in this period. An integrated spinning-weaving firm could introduce both technologies in a coordinated manner (as happened in New Enghnd), a vertically specialised industry could not (as did not happen in Lancashire). Second, ring spinning produces yarn attached to a heavy wooden bobbin, which, for weft yarn at least, had to travel to the weaving shed with the yarn. This does not matter if the firm is vertically integrated, because the weaving shed will be close by, if not in the same building. But in a vertically specialised industry, especially one in which individual regions specialise in either spinning or weaving, the transport costs associated with shipping bobbins from spinner to weaver and back again will slow the adoption of ring spinning.
Results
The Myth of the Corporate Economy addresses all of these questions, and, in addition, uses the new sources of data to compile new estimates of relative labor productivity in the two cotton spinning industries.
New series for ring and mule unit labor costs are constructed for both Lancashire and New England. For Lancashire, new estimates of mule unit labor costs axe constructed using the new wage data taken from the 1906 Enquiry, combined with standaxd data on spindles per operative [Jewkes and Grey, 1935 Although these figures show that previous authors have overstated the advantage available to those adopting ring spindles, they confirm the substance of the original hypothesis: the gain from adopting rings was in general considerably greater in New England than in Lancashke, and the rate of adoption there was correspondingly more rapid.
These new figures show that New England's universal preference for rings was rational, but they are not sufficient to show that Lancashite's precise rate of ring adoption was an optimal response to costs. We can, however, test Lancashke spinners' ability to optimize by looking at whether the variations in costs across Lancashire are sufficient to explain the differing rates of ring takeup. The 1906 Enquiry is used to calculate the proportion of yam spun on tings in each district as well as ring and mule unit labor costs in each area. A weighted least squares logistic regression model is used to assess whether the differences in the rate of ring adoption can be explained by these variations in costs. Transport costs (see below) are also included as a separate independent variable. Both labor savings and transport costs are significant, and the model has an R 2 of 0.768. When variations in factor cost savings of just 2% of the final selling price cause the rate of ring takeup to vary from 12% to 61%, we feel safe in concluding that cotton spinners in Lancashire responded closely and accurately to the costs that they faced.
The "institutional" critique of the Lancashire industry receives less support. That there were technical complementarities between ring spindles and automatic looms is not in doubt: the use of rings with plain looms meant that the weft yarn had to be rewound prior to weaving, a stage not necessary if using automatic looms. The question is whether this extra stage was sufficient to deter spinners from installing rings for weft without automatic looms. We can test this explicitly by looking at the behaviour of spinners in the years between the invention of the ring and that of the automatic loom. If spinners installed rings for weft in this period, we can say for sure that weft rings and plain looms represented an efficient combination and that integrated fixms, able to install both technologies in a coordinated manner, were not necessary to ensure the adoption of rings. For the United States, we use data from Copeland to show that, by 1890, just prior to the invention of the automatic loom, at least 45% of weft spindles were rings [Copeland, 1912, p . 70]. For Lancashire we limit ourselves to looking only at vertically integrated mills, that is, those mills for whom we know that transport costs cannot have reduced the rate of ring adoption. Combining data from the Sandberg, Lazonick, and Farnie gives a result very similar to that of the U.S.: 55% of weft spindles installed between the introduction of the ring and the automatic loom were rings [Sandberg, 1969, Lazonick has further argued that the additional transport costs of using rings in Lancashire's vertically specialized industrial system represent "the primary constraint on the introduction of ring spinning in Lancashire" [Lazonick, 1983, The new data assembled in this thesis allows us to better assess labor productivity in the Lancashire and New England cotton spinning industries. We construct four new, count specific, labor productivity series: for Lancashire mules, Lancashire rings, New England mules, and New England rings. Each gives the weight of each count of yarn that could be produced by one operative in one day. These allow us to compare relative labor productivity for any type of yam on either machine; equally they allow us to compare Lancashire mules with New England rings.
Each labor productivity series is constructed by multiplying data for output per spindle by data on the number of spindles tended per worker. In all cases the data applies to all installed machinery, rather than just to new machines. Our sources are generally the same as those we used when trying to assess unit labor costs. Output per spindle for Lancashire comes from Winterbottom and Taggatt [Winterbottom, 1907, pp. 204 Our productivity figures have implications for our understanding of comparative advantage. They show that Lancashire's export success was not built only on low wages, but also on high levels of labor productivity. Equally, although we know from trade statistics that the New England cotton industry was never a successful exporter, these figures show that this lack of success was caused not just by high wages, but also by low levels of productivity.
